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Supply Relational Risk: What Role Does Guanxi Play? 
 
ABSTRACT 
The topics of supply chain risk and global sourcing have garnered significant attention 
in recent years. Although there is ample circumstantial evidence of global sourcing risk, 
especially from the western-firm perspective of sourcing from China, few published 
studies have investigated the root causes of this risk. In this paper we argue that much 
of the risk associated with sourcing from China stems from the differences associated 
with institutional norms and philosophical orientation between western and Chinese 
thought and culture. Based on an in-depth literature review and case analysis, we 
compare western forms of supply chain relationship management with Guanxi, the 
Chinese form of relationship management and propose a framework of how western 
firms are exposed to supply relational risk when sourcing from Chinese suppliers. The 
framework proposed in this paper sheds light for supply chain managers with regard to 
the potential pitfalls facing firms when working with Chinese suppliers, and provides 
the groundwork for future research regarding supply chain practices and Guanxi 
networks.   
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INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid development of supply chain management, business risk management has 
increasingly shifted from the organizational level to the supply chain level (Harland et al., 
2003). The study and practice of supply chain risk management (SCRM) has been garnering 
greater attention in academe, as well as the board room of major corporations (Cavinato, 
2004; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008b; Rao and Goldsby, 2009; Christopher et al., 2011). Among 
these studies, Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) propose a comprehensive process of 
SCRM consisting of four constructs: (1) assessing risk sources for the supply chain; (2) 
defining adverse risk consequences; (3) identifying risk drivers in the supply chain strategy; 
and (4) mitigating risk for the supply chain. In this process, the first and most important step 
is to assess the risk sources, without which a firm simply cannot mitigate risks (Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008a). While the literature on managing risk continues to develop, research 
associated with risk identification is still in an early stage (Zsidisin et al., 2004; Rao and 
Goldsby, 2009). In this forward-looking paper, we focus on the emerging field of global 
sourcing risk and in particular the supply relational risk that may exist when western firms 
(specifically European and North American firms) source from China, one of the fastest-
growing production centers in the world (Salmi, 2006; Nassimbeni and Sartor, 2007; 
Biggemann and Fam, 2011; Kang et al., 2012). Despite the slowdown in manufacturing 
activity in China in recent years, sourcing activity in China will remain substantial and 
important for years to come--not just for export back to Western economies but also to 
support sales of Chinese subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations to the Chinese 
market (Fang et al., 2010; KPMG, 2012).  
As sourcing from low cost countries (LCCs) expands (Fredriksson and Jonsson, 2009; 
Ruamsook et al., 2009), there is a growing concern of supply risk. Numerous factors can 
contribute to the failure of a supply relationship, such as product quality or supplier 
reliability. However, when western firms source from China and attempt to build partnerships 
with Chinese suppliers, it is highly likely that they will encounter relational difficulties rooted 
in institutional, philosophical, and cultural differences (Jia and Rutherford, 2010). They 
define Supply Chain Relational Risk (SCRR) as “The risk to the supply chain of either party 
in a buyer-supplier relationship not fully committing to joint efforts due to either problems 
associated with cooperation or problems associated with opportunistic behavior” (Jia and 
Rutherford, 2010, p. 253).  
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Max Weber (1951) argues that although there are certain elements which could be 
regarded as preconditions for the development of rational capitalism in China, the legal and 
societal foundations for capitalist enterprise are absent in the Chinese economy: “Not only 
formal jurisprudence fail[ed] to develop, but a systematic substantive and thorough 
rationalization of law was never attempted” (Weber, 1951: p. 150).  Weber’s work explains 
one of the fundamental reasons behind the differences between Chinese and western cultural 
and economic systems. This dimension is also echoed by the two mechanisms regulating 
collective action proposed by Hui and Lin (1996), who claim that Chinese culture regulates 
collective action using relational mechanisms such as “face” and “familial sanction,” while 
American culture relies more on formal agreements. These relational mechanisms are part of 
a social system known as Guanxi, which bonds exchange partners through reciprocal 
exchange of favors and mutual obligations (Luo, 1997). 
The Guanxi network or extended family network is a major institution in China—
probably the major informal institution in the Chinese-speaking world as a whole (Parnell, 
2005). Xin and Pearce (1996) claim that Guanxi is a substitute for formal institutional 
support. Redding (1990) also argues that networks in China are useful in “the regulation of 
transactions in the absence of state institutions for that purpose (p. 56).” Family rules are 
pervasive and other rules are weak in comparison because family rules have been developed 
into and substituted for societal rules in China (Ge, 2006).  
Guanxi is a fully developed body of literature in organisational theory research 
(Hwang, 1987; Luo, 2000; Wong and Tam, 2000; Chen and Chen, 2004). In a supply chain 
context, it can be considered a Chinese form of relationship management as compared with 
western forms of relationship building such as networking (e.g., Cheng et al., 2012). For 
example, Barnes et al. (2011) found that ganqing, renqing and xinren (affection, favor and 
personal trust—three components of Guanxi) are crucial for fostering the development of 
such Sino-Anglo Business-to-Business relationships. Supply chain researchers have realized 
the importance of national culture in the buyer-supplier relationship (Metters et al., 2010). 
Zhao et al. (2006) call for research on the Guanxi’s effects on buyer-supplier relationships in 
China. Zhao et al. (2008) propose more cross-cultural investigation of the moderating effects 
of culture on the impacts of power on relationship commitment and supply chain integration. 
However, to date, the studies on the effects of Guanxi on the buyer-supplier relationship are 
in the initial stages, simply highlighting its importance (Millington et al., 2006; Salmi, 2006; 
Nassimbeni and Sartor, 2007; Giannakis et al., 2012) or reporting positive effects on 
performance (Lee and Humphrey, 2007; Cai et al., 2010; Cheng et al., 2012). Building on Jia 
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and Rutherford (2010), Kam et al. (2012) stress that the role of Guanxi in terms of risk 
management deserves further exploration. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
little empirical research devoted to this. This paper opens a new avenue of research by 
identifying risk sources associated with Guanxi as an example of supply risk caused by 
cultural differences associated with western firms sourcing from China.  
 
CASE METHOD 
Context and sample 
A case study of Bombardier’s (BA) procurement in China will be presented in order to 
inductively generate the supply relational risks caused by the differences between Chinese 
and western cultures (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Ellram, 1996). The case 
was chosen because it exemplifies an under-explored area of research and posed a daunting 
task for managers. In addition, the case highlights a major transfer of production from the 
west to China in a fairly short period of time, requiring the involvement of Shenyang 
Aerospace Corporation (SAC), the Chinese supplier, at the start of a new product 
development project. Both facts complicated the task, putting additional strain on the 
relationship between the two firms. The process suggested itself as an extreme case of 
shifting the development and production of strategic components—as opposed to the 
dominant practice of sourcing low value added items from China (see Yin, 2009). Finally, an 
all-western team of expatriates was stationed at SAC, the Chinese supplier. This made the 
task of understanding and adapting to the Chinese culture more difficult. This case, with its 
unique set of circumstances, provides an opportunity to witness cultural clashes and hence, 
offers an extreme illustration of western companies sourcing from China (See Voss et al., 
2002). It reveals the supply relational risk sources rooted in cultural differences between 
China and the West. 
               Bombardier (BA) is a Canadian Aerospace Corporation and a world leader in the 
design and manufacture of medium sized commercial aircraft. BA’s production sites are 
situated in North America, Europe and Asia and it has transferred 80% of the production of 
its Q-Series aircraft to SAC from its UK subsidiary and a Japanese supplier. This included 
supporting the transfer as if it were an internal transfer, with the UK subsidiary (BA Belfast, 
known as Short Brothers) taking full responsibility to develop SAC’s capabilities. An 
Interface Team selected from the UK subsidiary had been stationed in China since 2005. The 
entire team, with more than 20 participants, came from Western Europe and North America. 
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The interface team was based at SAC, with several team members staying for one to two 
years, while others rotated more frequently. 
              SAC is a subsidiary of the large, state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC). It designs and manufactures aviation products and provides aircraft maintenance 
services. Its mission is to be a world leading supplier in commercial aviation products. Since 
1985, SAC has expanded into the overseas aviation market, cooperating with other firms in 
the industry such as Boeing and Airbus. It has become a strategic supplier to these major 
players as well as BA.  
 
Data collection 
The data were collected through 16 semi-structured interviews, each lasting from 45 minutes 
to 1.5 hours, 12 at BA and 4 at SAC (see Table 1). All interviews were recorded, transcribed 
and coded using NVivo 11 software. During the interviews, we asked the interviewees to 
assess if the particular element of Guanxi caused tension or risk to the BA-SAC buyer-
supplier relationship and to provide real life examples illustrating the differences between 
Guanxi elements and western forms of relationship management identified from the 
literature. Extensive archival data (e.g., news coverage and company websites) were used to 
triangulate and complement the interview data. The unit of analysis is the relationship 
evolution and interactions between both parties.  
 
Data analysis 
In the first round of analysis we coded the transcripts identifying potential risk sources caused 
by the differences between elements of Guanxi and western forms of relationship 
management based on examples provided by the interviewees. In the second round of data 
analysis, we attempted to identify and examine the two higher level constructs of institutional 
norms and philosophical orientation.  
 
---Insert Table 1 About Here--- 
 
GUANXI RELATED SUPPLY RELATIONAL RISK 
Both BA and SAC’s parent companies signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 
2008 to formalize the strategic relationship and subsequently made significant financial 
investments (BA US$100M; SAC US$400M) several days after the formal announcement of 
BA’s C-Series development project. BA was the first Original Equipment Manufacturer 
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(OEM) to grant design authority on major supplied parts to China’s aviation industry, and 
SAC is now a major risk-sharing supplier on the new BA C-Series aircrafts (Anonymous, 
2012). 
 However, in 2011, BA contacted suppliers such as Aernnova about stepping in 
temporarily to build some components in reaction to unexpected problems in airframe 
manufacturing in China. Aernnova delivered the first center wing box to Bombardier in 
January 2012 (Flottau, 2012). According to an aerospace executive, the problem was in 
Bombardier’s supply chain management in China. Specifically, SAC was unable to handle 
the manufacturer’s design tools, which were already challenging using western data systems, 
even without a language barrier. According to the most recent news, BA is delaying delivery 
of its new C-Series plane until the second half of 2015, a costly setback that raises the risk 
that Airbus’s competing jet will arrive in airline hangars first (Keenan and Marotte, 2014). 
Bombardier subsequently took steps to reduce the risk that a Chinese supplier would delay 
the first test flight of the C-Series (Flottau, 2012).  
             Guanxi can be a source of supply relational risk because there are several distinct 
differences in its approach as compared with western forms of supply relationship 
management. Further, Guanxi prevails because this is the relationship marketing approach 
used by Chinese suppliers, rather than adapting to western relationship norms (Gummesson, 
2002). From a thorough literature review and analysis of the case we identify and propose 
that differences in institutional norms and philosophical perspectives are two higher-order 
constructs or themes that form the basis for supply risk caused by cultural differences, and 
that each of these two constructs consist of various risk sources for western firms sourcing in 
China. Each of these are discussed below and summarized in Table 2.  Table 3 provides 
representative quotes for each risk source identified. All of the supply relational risk sources 
resulted in significant schedule delays.     
---Insert Table 2 About Here--- 
---Insert Table 3 About Here--- 
 
Institutional norms 
Scott (2001) defines institutionalization as the process by which actions are repeated and 
given similar meaning by self and others. According to Scott, the aspects of the environment 
through which institutional influences operate include three pillars:  
 Regulative pillar includes regulatory structures, government agencies, laws and 
courts, professions, interest groups and mobilized public opinion;  
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 Normative pillar consists of values, norms and rules promulgated by trade and 
professional associations.  
 Cultural-cognitive conception of institution stresses the central role played by the 
socially-mediated construction of a common framework of meaning.  
 
Orthogonal to the three pillars, Scott (2001) proposes four types of carriers: symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines and artifacts and the six levels of analysis: world system, 
society, organizational field (Industry), organizational population, organization and 
organizational subsystem.  These carriers and levels of analysis imply that there are different 
sources of institution: world, society, industry and organization. Western rules and regulations 
have been applied at the societal level and even international levels. Relating to the network 
governance perspective, these institutions regulate firms by applying network governance 
mechanisms.  
Based on the BA case data and prior literature, we propose that there are three risk 
sources associated with institutional norms. They include risk associated with 1) hierarchical 
structure, 2) network governance, and 3) relationship building process.  
 
Risk associated with hierarchical structure  
The BA interface team used the western approach of interacting with the supplier to solve 
issues and problems at SAC. For example, western managers and engineers tend to solve 
problems interacting with their equivalent at the Chinese supplier. This was seen by Chinese 
managers as disrespectful because bypassing senior management is perceived as a lack of 
respect. The Chinese way is to obtain permission from top management and then decisions 
cascade down through the hierarchy of management. Many delays occurred before the 
interface team members realized this problem.  
             
Risk associated with network governance  
BA paid a great deal of attention to quality and its interface team consisted of more people 
from the quality department than any other functional department. However they were 
frustrated by the slow improvement at SAC in attaining BA’s quality standards. The process 
was hindered by SAC’s bureaucratic organizational culture commonly found in Chinese 
state-owned enterprises, in which SAC employees pay attention to Guanxi more than they 
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follow BA’s rules and procedures. The Quality Manager of BA’s interface team stated that 
they pushed SAC to follow the rules and procedures instead of actively self-improving.  
              Further, the interface team leader lost his temper several times during the formal and 
informal meetings with SAC personnel. From a Guanxi perspective of business relationships, 
this approach makes SAC lose face. The absence of reciprocity of renqing (or favor) was also 
a problem1. As a result, BA was not able to secure key SAC individuals’ trust (xinren) in the 
business relationship. 
           The interplay between face, renqing/favor and xinren/trust forms the essence of 
Guanxi network governance (Hwang, 1987). Guanxi dynamics emphasize the enjoyment of 
prestige without the loss of face and the saving of others’ face. Renqing may contain not only 
such substantive materials as money, goods or services but prioritizes reciprocity more than 
many other cultures (Hwang, 1987). In essence, reciprocity of favor is an implicit obligation 
within the Guanxi network. If one fulfils the implicit obligations, it is said that she or he owns 
xinren or personal trust from others within the Guanxi network. When one disregards this 
reciprocal obligation, he/she loses face and xinren, hurts related parties’ (i.e., friends and 
families) feelings, and eventually jeopardizes the Guanxi network (Park and Luo, 2001). 
            Chinese buyers and suppliers emphasize trust at a personal level rather than at an 
organizational level to generate partnerships. On the contrary, in the West, organizational trust 
is more credible than personal trust (Leung et al., 2005). In a similar vein, Parnell (2005) 
points out that exchange partners in Guanxi have affective and personal involvement in the 
relationship, resulting in effective commitment. This is also echoed by other researchers 
(Liang, 1949; Yang, 1992; Yang, 1994). In contrast, relational exchange partners in the West 
tend to have economic and impersonal involvement which leads to calculative commitment 
(Luo, 1997).  
 
Risk associated with the relationship-building process 
The BA interface team’s intention was to build the relationship with SAC at an organizational 
level following western customs and did not realize that Guanxi relationship building is 
flexible. However, without understanding and adapting to the flexible nature of the Guanxi 
relationship-building process, BA had significant difficulties securing trust in their 
relationship with SAC.  
                                                 
1 Hwang (1987) explains that renqing (favor) is ﬁrst a set of social norms by which one has to abide in order to 
get along well with others in Chinese society; and second a resource that an individual can present to another 
as a gift in the course of social exchange. 
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             Models that describe relationship building in a western context are similar in that 
they define the sequential stages of an evolutionary process from awareness through 
commitment/dissolution (Dwyer et al., 1987; Graen and Wakabayashi, 1994; Wilson, 1995; 
Iyer, 2002, Graen, 2003). Easton (1992) argues that progression through the stages of the 
relationship-building process, as first described by Dwyer et al. (1987), is based on the 
interplay of competition and cooperation (i.e., coopetition). Networking in the West is 
frequently associated with commercial corporate-to-corporate relations and is essentially 
formal (Luo, 2000). By contrast, Wong and Tam (2000) offer a Guanxi-building model that 
consists of three optional routing strategies through four psychological states, rather than 
sequential stages. For example, some western firms recruit the relatives of powerful Chinese 
government officials, who could help them obtain inside information of government 
contracts, and therefore are better positioned to win such contracts. We might argue that this 
model reflects the fact that Guanxi is essentially personal and informal (Luo, 1997; Parnell, 
2005) and the process of Guanxi building is featured by the interplay of face and renqing.  
  
Philosophical orientation 
Philosophy in this context refers to "Cultural Philosophy," which is a branch of philosophy 
that comes from a region’s culture. The consensus is that the West originated in ancient 
Greece and Rome. The concept of western culture is generally linked to the classical 
definition of the “Western World,” which is the set of literary, scientific, political, artistic and 
philosophical principles which set it apart from other civilizations (Duran, 1995). 
Confucianism, on the other hand, is the foundation of Chinese cultural values or put another 
way, Chinese culture is rooted in Confucian philosophy (Chen, 1911; Yau, 1994; Ge, 2006).  
          Based on the BA case and prior research, we propose that there are three sources of 
supply relational risk associated with the philosophical differences between western culture 
and Guanxi. They include risk associated with 1) family orientation, 2) the Yin-yang principle 
and harmony, and 3) time orientation. 
 
Risk associated with family orientation 
SAC’s procurement director stated that “western people are not like us. They don’t normally 
devote their full efforts to the company. We Chinese, especially people in aerospace industry, 
have the spirit of devotion. We devote ourselves to the company and the country.” The 
Interface Team Leader and the Quality Manager from BA did not agree with SAC’s working 
style, such as a lack of planning from SAC who often count holidays as working days in the 
Accepted for publication at Journal of Business Logistics 
10 
work plan, leaving no room for contingencies. BA also implied that SAC should differentiate 
work from personal life. This difference caused a mismatch in work schedules and eventual 
frustration to both parties. The mismatch between SAC's and BA’s work schedules can be 
explained by the difference between collectivist and individualistic cultures. 
          One of Hofstede’s (1991) five dimensions of national culture is Collectivism vs. 
Individualism, which measures the degree of individualism in society. Individualism pertains 
to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after 
himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Its opposite, Collectivism, pertains to 
societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into a strong, cohesive group, 
which protects a person for life in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  
Collectivist societies, such as China, place group goals and collective action ahead of 
self-interest, thus gaining satisfaction and feelings of accomplishment from group outcomes. 
Meanwhile western cultures are individualistic and place self-interest ahead of group goals 
(Hofstede, 1991; Earley, 1989; 1993; 1994; Triandis, 1989). In Chinese society, it is 
specifically the interests of the family that are put before individual interests (Liang, 1949; 
Lin, 2001). Family orientation is considered a form of in-group society rather than universal 
collectivism, and is known as ‘familistic collectivism’ (Yang, 1992). 
                             
Risk associated with the Yin-yang principle and harmony 
The “Yes means no” syndrome is one application of the Yin-yang principle. When the 
interface team leader lost his temper and pushed, SAC management tended not to push them 
back, but pulled by saying “yes,” essentially agreeing. However this does not mean they 
accepted BA’s view and instead they continued doing what they previously did. This caused 
further frustration from the interface team.  
           Strutton and Pelton (1997) explore the dynamics of relational conflict and attempt to 
link war strategies with the Yin-yang principle. The interpretation of the Yin-yang principle is 
that when relationships conflict, only two movements are available to either partner, to push 
or pull. The Chinese would take a strategy called yielding, whereby when the other party tries 
to attack or “push,” the Chinese would instead defend or “pull” and try not to confront the 
other party, and vice versa. This is called a complementary response. Western managers are 
often warned that the Chinese are heavily influenced by the military thoughts in Sun Tzu’s 
“The Art of War.”  The essence of successful warfare is deception, and one of the key 
weapons of deception is the yielding strategy. These war strategies have been widely applied 
in business in Asian countries including China, Japan and Korea (Ambler, 1994). 
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Yin and Yang represent the contrasting qualities within reality and experience. For 
example light contrasts with darkness, providing them both with context and therefore 
meaning. The Yin-yang principle, a Chinese form of dualism, argues that two states (Yin and 
Yang) co-exist in harmony and can be in transition from Yin to Yang and vice versa all the 
time (Strutton and Pelton, 1997). Achieving balance and harmony is essential for defense. 
Too much Yang makes one too aggressive and too much Yin results in failure to accomplish 
goals.  
In contrast, it has been argued that many westerners adopt a dualistic thinking in 
“black and white,” which means they normally consider that things must be one way or the 
other (Strutton and Pelton, 1997). In the West, Plato first proposes the dualistic concepts: 
heaven and earth, body and soul. Hammell (2006) claims that dualistic thinking is specific to 
western philosophy and tends to categorize anything into “either/or,” which contrasts with the 
Yin-yang principle and harmony.  Without appreciating and adapting to the dynamic 
transition between Yin and Yang (i.e., war strategies), westerners may feel deceived, which 
leads to distrust.  
 
Risk source associated with time orientation 
The interface team of BA intended to achieve objectives (e.g., transfer of production to SAC) 
in a comparatively short period of time and do everything efficiently whereas SAC, taking a 
long-term perspective, intended to build the relationship first before committing to work with 
BA. This misalignment caused tension between the two parties.  
Hofstede (1991) provides the fifth dimension of national culture which is long-term 
orientation. China scores high in the long-term orientation dimension whereas western 
countries often score low. This dimension refers to working in a positive, dynamic and future-
oriented culture linked with such Confucian values as persistence and thrift. Short-term 
orientation represents a negative, static, traditional and past-orientated culture. Styles and 
Amber (2003) argue that the building of Guanxi is associated with longer-term 
considerations. These relationships take time to develop, but once formed, are difficult to 
break and the obligations one has are difficult to avoid.         
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
There has been a surge of research on the topic of supply chain risk and many of its sub-
topics during the past fifteen years. Although many sources of supply chain risk have been 
proposed (e.g., Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a; Zsidisin, 2003), there has been little investigation 
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on the risk associated with supply chain relationships. Further, with a significant shift towards 
western firms relying more on suppliers located in China, there is limited insight on the 
theoretical underpinnings of risk when sourcing from Chinese suppliers. Although anecdotal 
evidence has been emerging of risk and the detrimental effects associated with sourcing from 
China (see Tang, 2008), we are not aware of a comprehensive examination investigating its 
underlying causes.  
This paper provides a framework of how Guanxi might cause supply relational risk 
for western firms sourcing from China and aims to open a new avenue for future research. We 
propose that western firms sourcing in China are exposed to the six supply relational risk 
sources that originate from cultural differences associated with institutional norms and 
philosophical orientation. This is by no means a comprehensive list. Rather, our aim is to 
provide an initial platform to understand supply relational risk when managing global supply 
chains. Cultural differences/distance between China and the West are simply identified as 
barriers to buyer-supplier relationships, but no one has explicitly spelled out what exactly 
they are. We hope that this research will ultimately increase western managers’ awareness of 
Guanxi-related problems when sourcing in China, and provide a foundation for understanding 
the cultural differences between China and the West. In managing relationships with Chinese 
suppliers it is vital that western companies at the very least understand the concept of Guanxi. 
Further, we realize that there are other factors contributing to the transfer in the BA 
case. For example, BA is not SAC's only customer. It is understandable that SAC needed to 
invest significant resources to projects with their other customers. However based on the 
analysis, cultural differences contributed directly to the delay of the first test flight of the C-
Series and this is one of the key reasons why BA finally decided to pull some production 
from SAC.  
        The theoretical constructs proposed in this paper are based on a single extreme case 
and the integration of various literature streams. Therefore, at this current stage of research, 
there is a lack of theory testing. Future research could empirically examine western 
purchasing manager perceptions of these supply relational risk sources with in-depth case 
studies and surveys. Such research can contrast the various management relationship styles 
employed by firms that have successful business relationships with Chinese suppliers with 
those western organizations that have encountered significant problems when sourcing in 
China. 
        Second, the paper focuses on the identification of risk sources based on prior 
theoretical frameworks, but did not discuss mitigating strategies that can be employed to 
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address supply relational risk when sourcing in China. With a view to mitigating Guanxi-
related supply relational risk we propose that another future research direction should explore 
how both western firms and Chinese suppliers manage such risks with the aim of answering 
the question: “How can firms mitigate against the relational risks associated with cultural 
differences?”   
            We believe that the extent of global trade and interconnectivity of supply chains will 
only grow in the future. With greater reliance on suppliers throughout the world, the 
prevalence and severity of supply chain risk is heightened. By better understanding and 
assessing risk in the supply chain, to include supply relational risk associated with Guanxi 
networks in China (as well as other cultures when sourcing from foreign countries or 
cultures), firms can learn to proactively adapt and mitigate potential problems in their supply 
chains. 
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Companies Interviewee’s Job Title Interview Sites  No. of 
interviews 
1. BA Belfast 
2. BA Belfast 
3. BA Belfast 
4. BA Belfast 
5. BA Belfast 
6. BA Interface team 
7. BA interface team 
8. BA interface team 
9. BA interface team 
10. SAC 
11. SAC 
12. SAC 
1. Program Manager, Q Series 
2. Sourcing Manager 
3. Supply chain quality manager 
4.           Head of logistics 
5.           Specialist buyer 
6. Interface team leader 
7. Chief buyer 
8. Quality manager 
9. Quality inspector 
10.          Project director 
11.          Procurement director 
12.          Quality director 
1. Belfast, North Ireland 
2. Belfast, North Ireland 
3. Belfast, North Ireland 
4. Belfast, North Ireland 
5. Belfast, North Ireland 
6. SAC office/site 
7. SAC office/site 
8. SAC office/site 
9. SAC office/site 
10. SAC office/site 
11. SAC office/site 
12. SAC office/site 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 1 
Table 1. List of interviewees, their titles and site visits
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Construct/T
heme 
Risk Source Perception of Western 
managers 
Perception of Chinese 
managers 
Risk representation in case 
 
 
Institutional 
Norms 
Hierarchical 
Structure 
Low power distance High power distance Misunderstanding of inter-organizational 
communication channels 
 
Network 
Governance 
Based on collective 
sanction 
Dynamic interplay between 
face, renqing and xinren 
 
Having difficulty obtaining xinren (personal trust) and 
subsequent lack of project commitment 
Relationship 
Building Process 
Step by step at 
organisational level 
 
Flexible, informal and 
personal relationships 
Experiencing difficulty in building xinren (personal 
trust) due to different approaches 
  
 
 
Philosophical 
orientation 
Family Orientation Individual goals 
prioritized 
 
Family or group goals 
prioritized 
Opposing views of work and personal life 
Dualism (ying-
yang)/Harmony 
Either or; black or 
white 
 
Dynamic transition from yin to 
yang and from yang to yin 
Differing approaches for address interorganizational 
and personal conflict 
Time orientation Short term Long-term Misaligning relationship building steps and timeframe 
 
Table 2. Supply Relational Risk Sources of Western Firms Sourcing in China 
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Supply relational risk sources  
Risk sources Representative Proof Quotes 
Hierarchical Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship Building Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Family Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
Dualism (ying-yang)/Harmony 
 
 
 
 
Time orientation 
 
 We kind of struggle at the beginning because the organizational structure we used to. Almost everything has to go through hierarchy and different 
functional departments at SAC. We asked a lot of stuff and got no answers from them. (Program Manager, Q Series)  
 I tried to address any problem arising at the peer level but I found I had to go to the higher level every time. Sometimes I have to go to the Deputy 
General Manager. Sometimes I have to go to his boss, the General Manager. That is very frustrating because the SAC project team seems not to be able 
to sort out the problems and just do what their senior management told them.  (BA Interface team leader) 
 
 Our normal behaviour wasn’t succeeding. I lost my tempter several times because I can’t get things done. It was so frustrating. (BA Interface team 
leader) 
 During the relationship building process, we had some arguments. If this happened between China, it is difficult to keep the relationship going. But we 
understand that Westerners are straightforward. We are not. Sometimes we don’t express our opinions directly because that way, somebody may lose 
face. We don’t want to offend anyone. This is related to the fact that Chinese emphasize harmony and saving face. (Quality director, SAC) 
 
 One of the things SAC is very keen to do is they often invite us for dinner, which is part of the process. We spent a lot of time on this. We really need to 
do something else. The problem is this kind of things is too often. Actually I see attending the dinner is part of our job. (BA Interface team leader) 
 In the west, systematic management method is implemented while in China we rely heavily on Guanxi. Our company has gradually adapted to the 
systematic management method. We can’t manage this fast growing company without a system and procedures. (Quality director, SAC) 
 
 I can see from SAC’s point of view, they put group interest ahead of their self-interest. They tend to say they work for the company and the company is 
everything. They work for their motherland and for the (communist) party. In the west, they work for themselves. (Chief buyer, BA interface team) 
 Western people don’t normally devote their full efforts to the company. We Chinese especially people in Aerospace industry have the spirit of devotion. 
We devote ourselves to the company and the country. For example, we could work day in and day out continuously for months to finish a project. 
During that period, we don’t normally go home at all and we stay at the temporary factory dormitory overnights. (Procurement director, SAC) 
 
 Here when you ask “can you do this, can you do that?” They answer “ok” but you don’t know if they do finish it because in a lot of occasions, they just 
don’t do it. (Quality inspector).  
 Nobody at SAC bangs the desk and demand. That happens in western company quite a lot… There are more pushes from BA’s perspective now. It is 
different philosophy. (Chief buyer, BA interface team) 
 
 The Chinese way is different. We were frustrated when they did not do things quickly enough. They were also frustrated because we asked them to do it 
too quickly. This is the major friction between us. We tend not to push too hard at the individual level but we pushed hard at the organizational level. 
(Quality Manager, BA’s interface team) 
 We understand that Western people are more straightforward than us and want us to work at their pace but we really would like to build trust with them 
in the first place. (Project director, SAC) 
 
Table 3. Representatives quotes to the supply relational risk sources 
